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Foreword 
This paper has been prepared as a contribution to a larger on-going research activity on high growth 
innovative enterprises (HGEs) and scale-up companies of the European Commission’s Joint Research 
Centre (JRC), led by the Unit for Finance, Innovation and Growth (B7). This broad activity analyses the 
sectoral and geographical variability and trends of HGE demographics in the EU and the framework 
conditions affecting their development with an emphasis on financing and risk-financing in particular. 
In keeping with the JRC’s role of providing evidence and analysis to underpin EU policy, the work is 
conducted in close contact with a wide range of Commission policy DGs, and is designed to provide 
both EU-wide and member state specific input to the annual cycle of economic policy coordination in 
the EU known as the “European Semester”. In the context of the COVID-19 crisis and the policy 
response to the immediate and subsequent socio-economic fallout, the vulnerability of high-growth 
and potential high-growth enterprises is a big concern particularly in view of the disproportionate 
contribution these enterprises can play in securing a sustainable exit from the crisis in the medium to 
long term. The importance of risk-capital and other means of financing for these firms means that it 
is vital to have a close-to-real-time means of monitoring the impacts of the crisis on venture capital 
markets in Europe and globally so that pertinent evidence can be provided also in close-to-real-time 
to those developing and implementing the policy response to the crisis. This paper represents a 
particularly timely contribution in this regard.  
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Summary 
 
High growth enterprises (HGEs) make a major contribution to economic growth. They are innovative, 
many are technology based and they make a disproportionate contribution to job creation. HGEs 
typically go through a ‘valley of death’ in which their costs exceed revenues as they develop their 
product, achieve market traction and scale-up. For many HGEs, access to venture capital – from 
venture capital funds, business angels and increasingly equity crowdfunding platforms - is therefore 
critical, providing a financial ‘runway’ that provides them with the opportunity to reach profitability. 
The economic crisis created by the COVID-19 pandemic is expected to result in both an immediate 
and longer-term contraction in the supply of venture capital. This will have a significant negative 
economic impact over the longer-term. Investors will focus on supporting their existing investee 
companies and therefore are much less likely to consider making new investments. Moreover, the 
financial capability of investors to make further investments may be constrained as investors in 
venture capital funds pull back and business angels experience a decline in their net worth as a 
consequence of the decline in financial markets. This raises concerns, first, that many HGEs will fail as 
they run out of cash and, second, that potential high growth start-ups that emerge from the crisis will 
not be able to raise pre-seed and seed capital.  
The immediate focus of government intervention has been to support the small business sector with 
measures to support their liquidity. A key focus has been the provision of loan guarantees to enable 
banks to lend to cash-strapped businesses.  However, this type of support is not appropriate for 
HGEs; moreover, the eligibility rules for such schemes often excludes such firms.  HGEs require other 
forms of financial support. These include co-investment schemes, tax incentives for business angels, 
convertible debt instruments and grants and other non-dilutive forms of finance.  Developing agile 
government procurement processes is also a significant lever for government support to technology 
businesses. Many of these support measures already exist but require modification to increase their 
reach. The effectiveness of some new initiatives has been compromised by poor design. The increase 
in financially constrained HGEs and investors may result in an increase in acquisition activity. 
Governments should therefore also consider the need for greater scrutiny of the takeover of 
emerging technology companies by foreign companies because of the risk that key knowledge assets 
will be transferred to other geographical regions. More generally, Government needs to ensure that 
entrepreneurial ecosystems remain intact. Finally, governments must also ensure that the 
contraction of VC investing does not widen existing geographical disparities in venture capital 
investing and, as a consequence, high growth firms. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The coronavirus pandemic has created a huge contraction in economic activity; output is falling and 
jobs are being lost. The IMF is expecting the GDP of developed countries to decline by 12% between 
the last quarter of 2019 and the second quarter of 2020, followed by a slow recovery. Other 
commentators are more pessimistic, suggesting that the GDP of developed countries will drop by 
between 15 and 30%.1 The Eurozone suffered its biggest fall in employment and activity on record in 
April 2020. Commentators also note that this is not a ‘normal’ recession. It will not discriminate: 
rather than simply clearing out less productive firms it will also result in the death of many good 
firms.2 There is a clear consensus that this economic crisis will result in a decline in venture capital 
(VC). Although venture-backed businesses represent a tiny proportion of businesses (Europe has 
18,000 venture capital-backed startups3), they make a disproportionate economic impact4 by 
financing innovative high growth enterprises (HGEs) which recent JRC research shows are responsible 
for most net employment growth in the EU. Moreover, as the JRC study also notes, VC backed 
companies are mostly high-tech.5 Furthermore, 190 European startups have surpassed a $1bn 
valuation - unicorn status. Venture capital investment has accelerated the rise of unicorns: 82% of 
unicorns are VC-backed, compared with only 20% a decade ago.6 The decline of VC will therefore 
have a negative impact on economic growth, not just in the immediate crisis period but also into the 
medium-term future. A sustainable economic recovery will depend on high growth, equity backed 
tech start-ups and scale-ups.  
 
This paper looks at the drivers of the decline in VC and the ways in which the decline in investment 
will occur and then considers the ways in which government should intervene to mitigate the 
adverse economic impacts that are likely to arise. It concludes by highlighting the need for research 
that focuses on business angel investing in view of the role that they play in financing businesses at 
the start of the scale-up tunnel. 
 
The paper has been written in response to the JRC’s invitation for  thoughts on appropriate 
interventions by governments and public authorities to support high growth enterprises (HGEs) to 
bridge the coronavirus crisis – what Sequoia Capital have termed “the black swan of 2020”7 8 -  to 
some unknown “new normal” and what research activities the JRC might undertake which can be of 
potential relevance to policy-makers in the current circumstances. The focus is on HGEs rather than 
SMEs in general and specifically on venture capital on account of its significance for the emergence of 
HGEs. The account draws on commentary from various business news sources including Sifted, 
                                     
1 Martin Wolf: coronavirus could be worst economic crisis since Great Depression, Financial Times, 17 th April. 
https://www.ft.com/video/fbaaa133-c94d-4e35-844b-bfde5f6a0635 
2 NESTA (2020) There will be no 'back to normal', 9 th April. https://www.nesta.org.uk/blog/there-will-be-no-back-
normal/?utm_source=Nesta+Weekly+Newsletter&utm_campaign=e99dadbc15 -
EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2020_04_13_12_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_d17364114d -e99dadbc15-181380285  
3 EuropeanStartups.co (2020) Europe’s Startup Ecosystem Navigating The COVID -19 Crisis, Launch report, 22 April. 
https://techround.co.uk/startups/european-startups-launch-report-reveals-the-first-large-scale-look-at-how-the-c urre nt -
crisis-is-impacting-startups-in-europe/ 
4 S Dumitriu (2020) What will it take to save the UK’s startups and scaleups?,  2nd April. https://sifted.eu/articles/uk-
startups-coronavirus-government/ 
5 Flachenecker, F., Gavigan, J., P., Goenaga, X., Pasi, G., Preziosi, N., Stamenov , B., Testa, G.,  (2020). High Growth 
Enterprises: demographics, financing & policy measures. JRC Technical Report. Joint Research Centre. Brussels, Belgium.   
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/publication/high-growth-enterprises-demographics-finance-policy-measures 
6 Europeanstartups. (2020) op.cit. 
7 https://medium.com/sequoia-capital/coronavirus-the-black-swan-of-2020-7c72bdeb9753 
8 However, Nicholas Taleb who coined the phrase to mean an unpredictable, rare, catastrophic event, has refuted this 
description, arguing that the pandemic was wholly predictable hence “a white swan if ever there was one”. The New Yorker  
(2020) The Pandemic Isn’t a Black Swan but a Portent of a More Fragile Global System, 21 April, 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-pandemic-isnt-a-black-swan-but-a-portent-of-a-more-fragile-
global-system 
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Financial Times, City AM, Inc Magazine, Forbes, The Entrepreneur’s Network, Pitchbook and a 
number of webinars. 
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2 VENTURE CAPITAL – AN OVERVIEW 
 
Venture capital is a specialist form of finance designed to meet the needs of emergent firms, 
particularly in technology sectors, which are pursuing significant growth opportunities. The financing 
needs of such firms typically exceed their capability of generating funds internally, while their ability 
to attract bank loans (debt finance) is restricted by their lack of collateral and negative cash flows. 
Indeed, the faster a firm grows the more voracious is its appetite for cash to invest in research and 
development (R&D), product development and testing, recruitment of key team members, premises,  
specialized equipment, marketing, sales and distribution capability, and inventories. Venture capital 
fills this gap in the supply of finance – termed ‘the valley of death’ – investing on a medium- to long-
term basis in exchange for an ‘equity stake’ to enable firms to scale-up and become profitable.9 At 
some point investors will seek an exit to realise the capital gain from their successful investments. 
Typically this takes the form of a sale to a large corporate group. A small proportion of larger exits 
occur by means of an IPO. 
 
There are three main sources of venture capital. These sources play complementary roles, financing 
HGEs at different points in their development. 
 
The first is business angels – wealthy private individuals (often successful cashed out entrepreneurs) 
who invest their own money in new and early stage businesses. It is ‘smart money’: business angels 
are ‘hands on’, drawing on their own entrepreneurial experience to provide advice, operational 
support and contacts to add value to their investee companies. The past two decades has seen the 
emergence of angel groups that enable individual angels to invest collectively rather than on their 
own. This has raised their visibility, expanded the pool of angel investors, increased the 
professionalisation of their investing, and increased the size of investments that they make. Angel 
investment is more significant now than during the economic crisis of 2008. Business angels 
dominate seed and early stage investing.  
 
The second are venture capital funds. They are professional investors who manage money raised 
from financial institutions (pension funds, insurance companies, banks, endowments, and 
increasingly sovereign wealth funds).  Venture capital funds typically specialise by stage of business 
and size of investment, with some operating at the seed stage, others at the growth stage and others 
at the later stage. The ease in which VCs have been able to raise finance from institutional investors 
over the past decade10 has resulted in an increase in the size of funds which, in turn, has brought 
about an increase in the size of investments and a shift away from seed and early stage investing. 
This is reflected in a much faster growth in the amount of finance invested by venture capital funds 
than the number of investments that has been driven by a growth of mega-funding rounds. The 
resulting market gap for small, early stage investments has been filled by angel groups, accelerators 
and seed VC funds. Some financial institutions also have their own venture capital subsidiaries. 
Several large nonfinancial companies, particularly technology companies, have established their own 
corporate venture capital subsidiaries which invest for strategic reasons in young technology 
companies to complement their own internal R&D activities. Most countries also have government-
backed venture capital funds that have been established to fill investment ‘gaps’ – both market gaps 
such as smaller investments and geographical gaps.  
                                     
9 It is important to emphasise that venture capital is distinctive from private equity whi ch invests to facilitate ownership 
change, typically involving the restructuring of large companies through management buyouts and buyins, family bus i nes s 
ownership transitions, and public-to-private deals. 
10 See EuropeanStartups.co (2020) Europe’s Startup  Ecosystem Navigating The COVID-19 Crisis, Launch report, 22 April.  
https://techround.co.uk/startups/european-startups-launch-report-reveals-the-first-large-scale-look-at-how-the-c urre nt -
crisis-is-impacting-startups-in-europe/ 
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The third is equity crowdfunding platforms that enable firms to raise finance from a large number of 
individuals, each investing a small amount.  Crowdfunding has only existed for little over a decade 
and has yet to experience an economic recession.  
 
Business angels are the most significant source of venture capital in terms of the number of 
businesses in which they invest, but the amounts that they invest are small.  Venture capital funds 
are the most significant in terms of the amounts invested, reflecting their much larger size of 
investments.  They will often provide follow-on investments for businesses that were initially funded 
by business angels. Equity crowdfunding platforms are still a relatively marginal source of equity 
capital, in part because they are highly regulated. In the UK, which has just three equity 
crowdfunding platforms, equity crowdfunding accounts for a minority of total seed and early stage 
funding (17% in the UK) although has grown rapidly in recent years. However, the significance of 
equity crowdfunding varies between countries on account the different regulatory regimes that are 
in place. According to Beauhurst, in the UK the largest 20 VCFs were involved in only 23 early stage 
deals in the £100,000-£2m size range out of a total of 1,634 deals.  The vast majority were financed 
by business angels, EIS funds (tax-efficient managed investment vehicles that raise finance from high 
net worth individuals to invest in eligible ventures) and crowdfunding.11  
 
Although only a small number of companies are backed by business angels and VCFs, they have a 
disproportionate impact on economic development, for example, in terms of innovation, job 
creation, R&D expenditures, and export sales. The injection of money and support from business 
angels and VCFs enables companies to grow much faster than the proceeds from sales revenue alone 
would allow. Moreover, this superior growth rate is sustained over the long run. Venture capital-
backed companies are faster at developing products and bringing them to market, pursue more 
radical and ambitious product or process innovation, and produce more valuable patents. VC-backed 
companies also have large multipliers, creating four or five jobs for every direct job that they creat e 
directly.12 A significant proportion of scale-up companies are venture capital backed. It is therefore 
clear that a decline in investing by business angels and VCFs will have significant immediate and 
longer-term negative impacts. 
 
 
                                     
11 Dumitriu, S (2020) most startups will fail, we should save them anyway, The Entrepreneur’s Net work, 7th April. 
https://www.tenentrepreneurs.org/blog/most-startups-will-fail-we-should-save-them-anyway 
12 D. Stanger (2020) What covid-19 means for start-up ecosystems and what can be done? Forbes, 1 April. 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/danestangler/2020/04/01/what-covid-19-means-for-startup-ecosystems-and-what-can-be -
done/#517cab1c3c81  
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3 IMPACT OF THE CORONAVIRUS ECONOMIC CRISIS ON VENTURE CAPITAL 
3.1 Impact on investment activity 
There is a unanimous consensus that the economic crises induced by the coronavirus will result in an 
immediate reduction in venture capital investing, affecting all of the providers – business angels, 
equity crowdfunding platforms and seed and venture capital funds, although most of the 
commentary relates to venture capital funds. Start Up Genome reports that in China – the initial 
location of coronavirus – venture capital deals dropped 50-57 percentage points in the first two 
months of 2020 compared with the rest of the world.13 And although there was a rebound in March 
with a six fold rise from February, investment in first quarter 2020 was less than half the amount 
invested in the same period in 2019. Moreover, seed investing was still in short supply.14 There have 
also been declines in VC investing elsewhere in Asia. UK evidence from Beauhurst indicates that 
there were 344 equity deals in Q1 2020, the lowest since Q4 2014 and a 32% decline from Q4 2019. 
There were just 95 deals in March 2020 that raised £595m compared with 174 deals in March 2019 
that raised £1.46bn.15 In contrast, EuropeanStarups.co observe that venture capital activity in March 
and April was not significantly lower than previous months and the same period last year, with 
several big deals being made.16 Similarly, Ascendant reported no material decline in the number of 
VC deals above £500,000 in UK and Irish technology companies in Q1 2020. However, it was 
acknowledged that these deals are likely to have been worked on for the past three to four months 
and that for some deals there would have been an imperative to complete before the end of the tax 
year.17 Venture capital investment activity is therefore a lagging indicator.  Ascendant also note that 
in the previous market crashes VCFs took about 4-6 months to really believe that the market had 
fundamentally changed and materially modify their investment activity.  What all of this suggests is 
that the most likely scenario is that there will be a steeper decline in VC investing over the remainder 
of the year and beyond. 
 
A decline in VC will impact both those businesses that have already raised one or more rounds of 
finance as well as entrepreneurs looking to raise venture capital for the first time18 with a dramatic 
impact on the ability of entrepreneurs both to start and to scale-up companies. Moreover, the 
impact will not be confined to the crisis period and its immediate aftermath but will be long-lasting.  
Start Up Genome reports that in the economic crisis of 2000-1 global venture capital fell by 21.6% 
over 12 months, taking three years to recover to pre-contraction levels; in the 2007-9 economic crisis 
it fell by 29.3% over 12 months, taking one year to recover to its pre-contraction level.19 However, 
there is significantly more VC available in Europe than was the case in 2008. 20 Indeed, the amount 
raised by venture capital funds across the EU-27 has risen from €16bn in 2015 to nearly €39bn in 
2019.21 This reflects the attractions of this asset class to financial institutions. But it has been argued 
                                     
13    https://theusbreakingnews.com/startup-genome-the-coronavirus-is-hurting-global-startup-investments/  
14 Financial Times (2020) Venture capital funding rallies in China after virus lockdown, 14 th April. 
https://digital.olivesoftware.com/Olive/ODN/FTUK/Default.aspx 
15 Beauhurst (2020) The effect of coronavirus on UK investment: Q1 2020. 2 nd April. 
https://about.beauhurst.com/blog/effect-of-coronavirus-uk-investment-q1-2020/ 
16 EuropeanStartups.co (2020) Europe’s Startup Ecosystem Navigating The COVID -19 Crisis, Launch report, 22 April. 
https://techround.co.uk/startups/european-startups-launch-report-reveals-the-first-large-scale-look-at-how-the-c urre nt -
crisis-is-impacting-startups-in-europe/ 
17 Reported in Young Company Finance (VCF) issue 256, April 2020.  
18 Lewin, A (2020) Fundraising during coronavirus: Are startups screwed? Sifted, 16 March. 
https://sifted.eu/articles/startup-fundraising-coronavirus/ 
19 Ibid. 
20 Sifted webinar: Startup funding during the crisis: what is really going on? 3 April.  https://sifted.eu/articles/startup-
funding-coronavirus/ 
21 EuropeanStartups.co (2020) Europe’s Startup Ecosystem Navigating The COVID -19 Crisis, Launch report, 22 April. 
https://techround.co.uk/startups/european-startups-launch-report-reveals-the-first-large-scale-look-at-how-the-c urre nt -
crisis-is-impacting-startups-in-europe/ 
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that the relative ease with which VC funds have been able to raise finance has resulted in them 
making higher risk investments. As a consequence, it has been estimated that the European VC 
industry entered this crisis with a significant amount of finance available to invest (so-called ‘dry 
powder’).22 According to data from Preqin, the UK venture capital industry has about $10.4bn of cash 
looking for investment opportunities — double the amount it had in 2014. Many funds therefore 
have money available to invest,23 although there are also smaller funds with limited capital available. 
However, even though some VCs say that they are continuing to invest in the crisis it is anticipated 
that the majority will slow down their investing. This is for three reasons.  
 
First, for the majority of their investee companies the crisis has created a huge demand shock. As the 
survey evidence below from Tech Nation illustrates (Figure 1), their burn rate of cash will increase as 
sales revenue falls much faster than they can reduce their costs. The Tech Tracker index of UK tech 
start-ups indicated that increasing sales is now their biggest challenge: 61% cited this as an issue — 
up from 45 per cent in the final quarter of 2019. Just 32 per cent of UK tech start ups are confident or 
very confident that their turnover will increase in the year ahead and more than one-third felt their 
businesses were not well prepared to deal with the economic downturn. And a report by Dealroom 
estimated that one-third of European tech companies were “vulnerable” to the Covid-19 crisis.24 
Hence firms that have already raised finance are likely to need to raise follow-on funding sooner than 
had been anticipated.  Providing finance to extend their financial runway is crucial if they are not to 
fail. 
 
 
Figure 1. Challenges Reported by UK Technology Scale-ups in the early stage of the coronavirus crisis 
(n=116) 
 
                                     
22 EuropeanStartups.co (2020) Europe’s Startup Ecosystem Navigating The COVID -19 Crisis, Launch report, 22 April. 
https://techround.co.uk/startups/european-startups-launch-report-reveals-the-first-large-scale-look-at-how-the-c urre nt -
crisis-is-impacting-startups-in-europe/ 
23 Financial Times (2020) Lombard: Start-up saviours, 6th April. https://www.ft.com/content/523024de-9115-45ee-923a-
fd9a32a2502f 
24 All statistics from City AM (2020) UK tech startup confidence slumps amid Covid-19 crisis, 22nd April. 
https://www.cityam.com/exclusive-uk-tech-startup-confidence-slumps-amid-covid-19-crisis/  
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Source: Tech Nation (2020) The challenges facing UK tech in the Coronavirus crisis – scaleups surveyed, 31 March. 
https://technation.io/news/the-challenges-facing-uk-tech-in-the-coronavirus-crisis-scaleups-surveyed/ 
 
Second, the ability of VCs to raise new funds is expected to be much harder.  Over the past decade 
many non-traditional investors in VC have entered the industry – including family offices, non-
financial companies, hedge funds, investment banks, private equity firms and sovereign wealth 
funds. These investors have dominated investment in VC and PE over the past decade and more. 
Indeed, European VCs account for less than half (36% in 2019) of total investment in European start-
ups, with the remainder coming from Asian and US VCs, family offices, corporate venture capital and 
sovereign wealth funds.25 This has driven the emergence of mega funds that dominate later stage 
investing. These funds have provided significant amounts of funding to enable ‘unicorns’ – typically 
platform economy businesses - to sustain massive losses for a long period of time to dislodge 
incumbents or triumph over less well funded competitors, enabling them to remain private for longer 
without the need for an IPO.26  It is suggested that some of these non-traditional investors are now 
overexposed to venture capital as an asset class and so will reduce their investment, becoming much 
more selective in the process. This is partly for technical reasons – the ‘denominator effect’: if the 
value of their other types of investments go down then they will become over-allocated to venture 
capital, prompting them to pull back on investing both directly and indirectly, via funds, in venture 
capital.  However, it is also suggested that some of these non-traditional investors do not have a 
long-term commitment to the VC industry (“tourist money”) and may stop investing if returns 
decline. If they pull back then this will create a liquidity crunch for later stage start-ups (Series B, C 
…).  Investors may be unwilling to continue to fund these companies as exit options become more 
difficult and valuations drop.27 Corporate venture investors – investing in early stage innovative 
companies as an external R&D and growth strategy - pulled back more quickly and sharply than other 
                                     
25 EuropeanStartups.co (2020) Europe’s Startup Ecosystem Navigating The COVID -19 Crisis, Launch report, 22 April. 
https://techround.co.uk/startups/european-startups-launch-report-reveals-the-first-large-scale-look-at-how-the-c urre nt -
crisis-is-impacting-startups-in-europe/ 
26 Kenney, M and Zysman, J (2019) Unicorns, Cheshire cats, and the new dilemmas of entrepreneurial finance, Venture 
Capital: an international journal of entrepreneurial finance, 21 (1) 35 -50. 
27 Ibid. 
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investors in the 2008-9 global financial crisis.28 Hits to their earning and loss in their stock price value 
is likely to discourage them from making substantial external capital outlay.29 It has also been 
suggested that US VCs which over the past decade increased their investing in Europe as US 
investment opportunities became expensive and now account for a significant proportion of later 
stage investments in Europe – are likely to cut back their commitment to investing in Europe.  Most 
of these firms do not have a permanent physical presence in Europe, investing on a ‘fly-in’ basis. It is 
expected that less ‘fly-ins’ will happen, reducing their investment activity.30   
 
Third, opportunities for investors to exit, both to harvest successful investments and also for distress 
sales, will diminish. Investors will have to write-down many of their investments on account of their 
poorer prospects for the future growth and profitability, reducing the likelihood that they will be able 
to exit from many of their investments. Falling prices and fewer opportunities to sell may require VCs 
to delay exits, requiring them to fund such companies for longer either out of necessity or to make 
them more appealing to buyers when market conditions improve. Acquisition by large companies is 
the most common way in which exits occur, with stock market listings only an option for larger 
businesses. There is likely to be a slowdown in the M&A market as large companies are less likely to 
make acquisitions  as they focus on their own liquidity and maintaining operations. The stock market 
has also closed to IPOs. For those exits that do occur, valuations will fall, returning less cash to 
investors and entrepreneurs.  This reduces their capacity to make new investments. Fewer exits and 
downward pressure on the valuation of those exits that do occur will have a negative impact on fund 
performance making it harder to raise new funding the future.  
 
In this context in which demand for investment is increasing and there are uncertainties about the 
ability to raise future funds, VCs will therefore stretch their existing funds for longer and will be more 
cautious in future investing.  This has implications both for firms in their portfolios and for firms 
seeking to raise finance for the first time. 
 
3.2 Impact on Portfolio Firms 
 
There is a clear consensus that VC funds will re-focus their attention on keeping their portfolio 
companies afloat – “everything else is secondary.” Indeed, it is reported that some VCs have 
withdrawn from new investments after signing term sheets and sending letters of intent. 31 Because 
of their high level of investing in recent years VCs have a lot of companies in their portfolios. Venture 
capital firms adopt a staged approach to funding, with most reserving 50% of their capital for follow-
on investing. Portfolio companies require follow on capital because they are loss making as they 
grow, investing in innovation and growth. Investors will prioritise their capital for their portfolio 
businesses, reducing the number of new investments that they make. They also have to consider 
whether the money that their Limited Partners (LPs) have promised will actually materialise and 
whether they will have to delay further fundraising. These risks will also discourage new investments. 
Commentators therefore suggest that VCs will seek to conserve their cash, using their funding more 
selectively to focus on the most promising businesses in their portfolios to ensure that they survive.  
It has been estimated that one-fifth of VC-backed companies are in markets that are growing rapidly 
as a result of the crisis.32 VCs will also need to redesign the way in which they support their portfolio 
                                     
28 Stangler (2020) op.cit. 
29 Pitchbook (2020) Covid-19 influence on European VC market. 17 th April. 
30 Sifted webinar: Startup funding during the crisis: what is really going on? 3 April.      https://sifted.eu/articles/startup-
funding-coronavirus/ 
31 Beauhurst (2020) op.cit. 
32 EuropeanStartups.co (2020) Europe’s Startup Ecosystem Navigating The COVID -19 Crisis, Launch report, 22 April. 
https://techround.co.uk/startups/european-startups-launch-report-reveals-the-first-large-scale-look-at-how-the-c urre nt -
crisis-is-impacting-startups-in-europe/ 
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companies. Meanwhile companies will use the finance that they are able to raise to sustain their 
existing operations rather than to fuel further growth. 
 
Companies that were expecting to raise more cash in the future may not be able to do so because 
customer acquisition and sales are likely to fall or they may simply not be able to make sales, making 
it more difficult to demonstrate market traction, resulting in the failure to meet the milestones that 
were set at the previous funding round. VCs will therefore focus on evidence for customer 
engagement. Early market validation is therefore likely to play a bigger role in future VC investment 
decisions. Sales and revenue is one indicator, but in some cases this may be a false indicator 
reflecting a temporary need, hence metrics that demonstrate engagement may be given more 
emphasis (e.g. net customer retention; power users). VC-backed companies with drug R&D and 
clinical trials in vaccines and infectious diseases are also well positioned for growth but have high 
burn rates due to their high R&D costs and capital expenditure and risk of delay and disruption to 
clinical trials. High cash burn companies that VCs have supported on the basis of enabling them to 
grow their gross merchandise volume (GMV) but which are unprofitable are particularly vulnerable. 
Firms with only a short runway of cash (less than six months) will be particularly vulnerable.”  It may 
be fatal for firms in the process of raising a new round of finance.  Indeed, one commentator 
suggests that even if the Coronavirus is ‘over’ in six months, “anyone with less than 12 months 
runway is dead.” 
 
In summary, the companies in the portfolios of venture capital funds will have different experiences 
in their ability to both to survive and raise further funding depending on the following: how recent 
was their last funding round; stage of development; size of their cash pile; product/market; whether 
they are revenue generating or pre-revenue; their business model (e.g. contract based companies 
such as SaaS); and if they are consumer-oriented.33  EuropeanStartUps.co capture this divergence in 
the prospects for European VC-backed startups (Table 1) and stage (Table 2), underlining the 
observation of one commentator that “businesses are all in the same storm but not in the same 
boat.”34 
 
 
Table 1. The Outlook for European VC-Backed Startups: (a) market served 
 
Category Challenges Examples 
Net positive Managing rapid growth, even 
harder during lock-down - 
Consumer health: Groceries: 
Collaboration tools: 
Biotech & B2B health: 
 
Defensible Operational challenges 
Shrinking lead pipeline, selling 
gets harder Heightened cash 
awareness, dealing with runway 
Deep tech: Clean tech: Online 
payments: Developer tools 
 
Vulnerable  Need to reduce costs Fashion and apparel: Car sale: 
Proptech: Lending 
Most affected Sometimes revenues going to 
zero 
Travel: Mobility: Jobs 
Source: EuropeanStartups.co (2020) Europe’s Startup Ecosystem Navigating The COVID-19 Crisis, Launch report, 22 April. 
https://techround.co.uk/startups/european-startups-launch-report-reveals-the-first-large-scale-look-at-how-the-c urre nt -
crisis-is-impacting-startups-in-europe/ 
                                     
33 Pitchbook (2020) COVID-19's Influence on the US VC Market, 1st April. 
34 Quote from Victoria Lennox, President and Founder of Startup Canada at a NACO roundtable webinar on Innovations in 
Health Care, 23rd April. 
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Table 2. The Outlook for European VC-Backed Startups: (b) stage of development 
 
Stage Average 
number of 
employees 
Size of last 
funding 
round €m 
Potential outcome 
   1st & 2nd quartile 
performers 
3rd and 4th quartile 
performers 
Pre-Seed & 
Seed 
20 1-4 Can manage cash-burn Can 
raise from investors if 
needed Accept smaller 
round & valuation 
Sufficient seed capital 
available 
Even in a normal 
circumstances, 70-80% of 
seed stage startups do not 
make it to series A 
Series A  70 4-15 Can manage cash-burn Can 
raise from investors if 
needed Accept smaller 
round & valuation Plenty 
of series A capital available 
Many will reduce team by 
25-50% For some, crisis 
will be fatal 
Series B+  160 15-100 Cash-burn harder to 
manage Shortage of 
European mid-stage capital 
already pre crisis, now 
worse 
Many will reduce team by 
25-50% Focus on 
profitability Crisis will be 
fatal for many, including 
some that otherwise 
would make it 
Later  600 100+ Sufficient growth equity 
available but terms have 
changed dramatically (e.g. 
Airbnb) 
A few high-profile failures 
in bottom quartile (e.g. 
WeWork) 
Source: EuropeanStartups.co (2020) Europe’s Startup Ecosystem Navigating The COVID-19 Crisis, Launch report, 22 April. 
https://techround.co.uk/startups/european-startups-launch-report-reveals-the-first-large-scale-look-at-how-the-current-
crisis-is-impacting-startups-in-europe/ 
 
There are three further significant consequences that arise from the exacerbation of the ever-
present power disparities between entrepreneurs and VCs that results from the widening gap 
between the demand for finance from portfolio companies and the increased caution on the part of 
VCs to invest.  
 
First, deal terms will shift back favour of investors from their present entrepreneur-friendly terms. 
This will see the re-emerge of participating preference shares, liquidation multipliers, anti-dilution 
provisions, rachets and warrants in term sheets.35  
 
Second, valuations will fall. Estimates range from 10-40%, depending on the stage of the company. 
Most agree that later-stage startups will get hit the hardest as they reflect public markets which have 
fallen by between 25% and 40%36 - albeit this is a return to the level of three or four years ago. This 
will exert a downward pressure on valuations. BVCA members reported that they expect to 
                                     
35 Sifted (2020)Term sheet turbulence: startups on a bumpy journey, 20 th April. https://sifted.eu/articles/term-sheets-
startups-coronavirus/ 
36 Ibid. 
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significantly mark down portfolio valuations – the average anticipated mark down was 20%.37 
Investee businesses at series A and B rounds will find it difficult to meet the growth projections that 
set the price of the previous funding round, especially where an investee’s cash reserves have been 
run down (a situation that can be created by unethical investors) which will also result in  lower 
valuations. Entrepreneurs will therefore have to part with more equity. Dilution has implications for 
earlier investors in the business, including the founding team. It also has knock-on effects on later 
rounds. 
 
Third, there is likely to be a growth in demand for venture debt which offers a valuable alternative 
means for high growth companies to lengthen their financial runway. Providers include dedicated 
venture lenders and traditional banks and debt providers. Currently European scale-ups have access 
to less venture debt than U.S. scale-ups.38 Venture debt has two attractions. First, it may be cheaper 
than an equity round in which investors are looking for a steep discount. Second, it will not dilute 
entrepreneurs and early investors. Inflated valuations in recent years have made down rounds a 
likely outcome for companies that have taken hits on their growth and need to raise capital in the 
near future. Prior venture capital funding serves as a certification towards venture debt lenders and 
they can rely on a scale-up’s patents as collateral, using warrants to overcome the agency problems 
associated with debt. For the suppliers of venture debt. However, debt repayments are not without 
risk. They can cut into cash streams for growth, putting more stress on companies that have seen 
revenues fall. Hence it is only appropriate for companies that are to cover loan payments: good 
candidates for venture debt are companies with SaaS and subscription-based business models.39 
 
 
3.3 Impact on new investment activity 
 
There will also be less finance available for start ups seeking to raise their first round of venture 
capital. These companies will face financial challenges because they have little or no cash buffer  to 
cope with their lack of revenues.  As a result, some will fail. Others will go into hibernation. And some 
will continue to bootstrap. A survey of 250 growth businesses in the UK currently seeking investment 
reported that more than 9 out of 10 will close within the next 12 months if their current investment 
plans are disrupted.40   
 
Venture capital funds will be concerned about the businesses that are currently in their portfolio, 
particularly their late stage investments that are closest to exit, have the highest valuations but also 
high burn rates.  Making new investments will not be their priority. 41 As one seed capitalist notes: 
“we have had to refocus our strategy on ensuring our existing portfolio of companies remain strong. 
They have revenues, contracts and funding to help mitigate the situation. However, we are likely to 
turn away around a dozen great, new and exciting companies that we hoped to support ….  because 
                                     
37 British Venture Capital Association (BVCA)(2020)  BVCA Feedback on Impact of COVID -19 on the UK Private Equity and 
Venture Capital Industry: 4 th report. 9th April. 
https://www.bvca.co.uk/Portals/0/Documents/Policy/BVCA%20Feedback%20on%20the%20Impact%20of%20COVID -
19%20-%2009-04-20.pdf?ver=2020-04-09-171929-697&utm_campaign=1882479_Friday%20Focus%2010-04-
20&utm_medium=dotmailer&utm_source=BVCA  
38 Manigart, S, Vanacker, T, Knockaert , M and  Verbouw, J (2020) Financing intangibles: Is there a market failure? University 
of Ghent. Paper drafted for the DG GROW Economic Seminar 
39 Pitchbook (2020) Venture Debt Set to Increase Role During Crisis. 24 th April. https://pitchbook.com/news/reports/q2-
2020-pitchbook-analyst-note-venture-debt-set-to-increase-role-during-crisis 
40 Save Our StartUps, 9th April. https://mailchi.mp/5cccf910d8d0/join-the-save-our-startups-campaign-
update?e=e52146854c  
41 Blank, S (2020) What's Plan B? The Lifeboat Strategy for Your Startup, INC Magazine, 17 March. 
https://www.inc.com/steve-blank/coronavirus-covid19-pandemic-startup-leader-response-plan-strategy-crisis.html 
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the capital flow has diminished.”42 This will be exacerbated by travel restrictions and the associated 
difficulties in organising face-to-face meetings which will slow down deal sourcing and the due 
diligence process. And VCs that are seeking to raise their first fund will struggle to close.  Only VC 
funds that have recently completed fund-raising, and hence with few companies in their portfolio, 
will be in a position to focus on making new investments. For all these reasons there will be fewer 
investors interested in investing in startups, and, as noted above, entrepreneur-friendly deal terms 
will disappear and valuations will get worse. One investors commented that “if you’re raising 
€500,000 to €5m, [you were going to give away] 20% of your company; now it might be 25%.” 43 
Similarly, Eamonn Carey, Managing Director at the Techstars London Accelerator, commented that 
“in the past a seed round would give away 10-15%, maybe 20%. But now it is 25% of their equity”.44 
This may prompt some entrepreneurs to reject the terms that they are offered and look for other 
ways to start (e.g. soft start). But the job losses resulting from the crisis is likely to increase start-up 
rates, increasing the demand for seed capital.  
 
This emphasises the importance that business angels - which, as noted earlier, are the dominant 
source of equity capital, financing many times the number of businesses that raise finance from 
venture capital firms – continue to invest.  However, they may have lost wealth from their 
mainstream investments in financial markets and property. They will also be looking to conserve cash 
to support their existing investments, particularly given the likelihood that it will be much more 
difficult for their investee businesses to raise follow-on investment from venture capital funds. 
Stephen Page, chief executive of Startup Funding Club, claimed that angel investors, who would 
typically invest in early-stage firms, are making a "run for the hills".45 
 
Equity crowdfunding platforms are also experiencing a drop in investment activity. This, in turn, puts 
the platforms themselves at risk as their revenue is based on fee income that is related to the funds 
raised. Both Seedrs and Crowdcube are themselves backed by VC and are still lossmaking. 46  
 
To the extent that angels and VCs do consider new investment opportunities, these will be focused 
on “start-ups with a pandemic purpose”,  for example in health (especially personalised digital 
health) and education and in B2C markets that have been impacted by the coronavirus crisis (e.g. 
digital fitness, entertainment, remote working), whereas many consumer-oriented businesses will 
struggle to raise finance. These markets are indicated in Figure 2 from Dealroom.com. 47 However, 
there is a danger that this shift in the focus of venture capital investing in response to the ‘shock’ will 
result in inefficiencies in capital allocation that is driven by ‘the fear of missing out’, with over-
investment in particular types of businesses while starving other sectors of investment, repeating 
previous episodes of ‘venture capital myopia’.48  
 
 
Figure 2. Structural vs. cyclical impact of the coronavirus crisis: a mental framework 
                                     
42 J Smith (2020) Why government needs to boost EIS tax relief to 80% to save our start -ups. Growth Business.co.uk. 
https://www.growthbusiness.co.uk/why-government-needs-to-boost-eis-tax-relief-to-80-to-save-our-start-ups-2557477/  
43 Sifted (2020)Term sheet turbulence: startups on a bumpy journey, 20 th April. https://sifted.eu/articles/term-sheets-
startups-coronavirus/ 
44 HBAN webinar on Investing during COVID-19: a view from London, 22nd April. 
45 Daily Telegraph (2020) Third of start-ups in UK and Europe 'at risk of collapse', report warns. 21st April.  
46 Sifted. Crowdfunding platforms grapple with slowdown, 2 nd April. https://sifted.eu/articles/crowdfunding-coronavirus/ 
47 Dealroom.co (2020) Impact of the Corona crisis on startups & tech: initial findings. https://blog.dealroom.co/wp-
content/uploads/2020/03/Corona-vFINAL.pdf  
48 Sahlman, W A and Stevenson, H H (1985) Capital market myopia, Journal of Business Venturing, 1 (1), 7 -30. 
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Source: Dealroom.co (2020) Impact of the Corona crisis on startups & tech: initial findings. https://blog.dealroom.co/wp-
content/uploads/2020/03/Corona-vFINAL.pdf 
 
 
3.4 Summary 
 
The shock to the entrepreneurial finance system as a result of COVID-19 will result in a decline in the 
amount of venture capital that is invested and in the number of deals that occur as investors seek to 
preserve the funds that they have already raised and encounter difficulties in their ability to raise 
new funds as financial institutions lose their enthusiasm for VC as an asset class. This decline will 
occur over a significant period of time and not be confined to the disruption in investment process 
caused by the crisis itself, and will therefore impact on the speed and strength of the economic 
recovery. Moreover, there will be a shift in the focus of the investment activity that continues.  There 
will be a slowdown in mega deals (and because they are individually so large just a small decline in 
the number will have a significant impact on the amount invested). A larger proportion of deals will 
be follow-on rounds as investors put more capital into portfolio companies to lengthen their financial 
runway. Venture capital funds will focus on the venture stage rather than seed.   
 
The likely direct outcome of these developments are as follows.  First, companies that have traction 
cannot now develop and will stall. Second, recent start-ups will close resulting in the loss of 
businesses that might otherwise have flourished. Third, substantially fewer businesses will be started 
that have the potential to scale. Even companies addressing opportunities created by Covid-19 may 
struggle to raise cash. This drought in start-up finance risks losing the pipeline of future HGEs, with 
the impact only becoming apparent in three to five years’ time. There will also be important 
intangible consequences. In particular, investors will become more risk averse. And entrepreneurs – 
and investors – may not be able to pick themselves up from the emotional loss that they will suffer 
from the closure of the businesses - their products, processes, knowledge and relationships - that 
they have worked hard to build. 
  
The strength of the recovery will depend on high growth, equity backed start-ups and scale-ups. 
Although such companies are small in number they have a disproportionate economic impact. 49 
These types of companies will be responsible for a large proportion of future job growth.  The 
disruptions that economic crises cause to existing markets catalyses innovation by creating an 
                                     
49 Dumitriu, S (2020) What will it take to save the UK’s startups and scaleups?  Sifted 2 nd April. https://sifted.eu/articles/uk -
startups-coronavirus-government/ 
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environment for entrepreneurs to launch new products, services and business models. Many 
successful companies are created in such times. For example, companies started in 2008/9 include 
WhatsApp, Slack, Airbnb, Stripe, Uber, Waymo Pinterest and Git Hub. Because these types of 
companies are typically loss making as they invest in scaling up and indeed may not be revenue 
generating for some time after starting they are not helped by the support that governments have 
introduced to support the small business sector – particularly loan schemes. Government 
intervention to support these companies needs to be based on ensuring that they can continue to 
access venture capital.  The next section considers the policy interventions required to achieve this 
outcome. 
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4 HOW SHOULD GOVERNMENTS INTERVENE? 
There is a need to recognise that the crisis has different stages that require different types of 
intervention.  First, is the immediate crisis – the ‘confinement’ stage when economic activity has 
largely ceased.  Here the objective is to prevent viable businesses from failing. Second, is the 
‘convalescent’ phase during which time economic activity slowly picks up.  The priority here is to 
support businesses to enable them to build up revenue again.  Third, the mid- to long-term recovery 
phase when the ‘new normal’ emerges.  The key challenge for government is to avoid becoming 
preoccupied with measures to address the immediate crisis but also to focus on the medium term to 
ensure that economies do not experience a drought of start-ups and scale-ups on account of the lack 
seed stage funding. Although government needs to focus on the immediate crisis it is important that 
the present time is also used to develop appropriate interventions for the recovery phase.  Similarly, 
Governments must also recognize that, as noted in the previous section, entrepreneurial finance 
comprises different markets and different players hence a variety of types of intervention are 
required and focus cannot just be on the institutional venture capital industry.  
 
4.1 To What Extent Can Previous Crises Provide Guidance? 
It is debatable how much can be learnt from previous crises such as the post-2000 dotcom crash and 
the 2008 global financial crisis and the extent to which they should inform policies to address the 
present crisis.  Indeed, over-reliance on the experience of past crises would be “fighting new battles 
with old weapons”. Responses need to go beyond earlier playbooks. 
 
The 2008 financial crisis was a global business crisis that had overleveraged lenders at its core. 
Central banks had direct levers to provide funding to distressed banks and by purchasing assets. In 
this crisis the causality runs in the opposite direction with the coronavirus triggering a corporate debt 
crisis that is resulting in bank losses.  In this crisis banks should be part of the solution, not part of the 
problem.  As a result of stricter capital requirements the banking sector is healthier than was the 
case in 2008. The concern is that banks are retreating from risk taking.  A further source of concern is 
that risk has migrated to the non-bank part of the financial system – both traditional investors such 
as pension funds, insurance and mutual funds and newer investors such as hedge funds and private 
equity.50 Governments therefore need to create tools that encourage the financial system to 
continue to commit capital to businesses, and HGEs in particular.51 It has been suggested that the 
dotcom crisis of 2000 may be a better parallel in that it, like now, it had been fueled by the easily 
availability of venture capital in the ‘dot.com boom’ and tech companies relied on selling to one 
another, creating a ‘house of cards’ that quickly collapsed once the crisis kicked in.  The venture 
capital industry recovered much faster after the 2008 GFC than it did following the 2000 dotcom 
crisis.   
 
 
4.2 Approaches to intervention 
 
Many small businesses have limited cash reserves and are likely to become insolvent fairly quickly as 
sales dry up. In an attempt to mitigate this outcome Governments have  introduced a wide variety of 
support measures for the small business sector in general to help them preserve cash,  providing loan 
                                     
50 Financial Times (2020) Global finance: the weak link? 14 th April. 
https://digital.olivesoftware.com/Olive/ODN/FTUK/Default.aspx  
51 Carstens, A (2020) Bold steps to pump coronavirus rescue funds down the last mile, Financial Times, 29 March, 
https://www.ft.com/content/5a1a1e9c-6f4d-11ea-89df-41bea055720b 
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finance, both directly though state agencies and by providing guarantees to banks, subsidising 
employee costs, and allowing the deferral of tax, business rates and social security payments.  These 
interventions are focused preventing a cascade of business closures during the immediate crisis.52 
Suspension of wrongful trading legislation and director duties and responsibilities (which also applies 
to investors who take board positions) to enable them to navigate the current crisis has also been 
suggested53 but not so far implemented. 
 
However, these schemes will have limited benefits for HGEs.  Providing access to debt through 
guaranteed loans schemes is not an appropriate financial instrument in which to support the 
majority of high growth start-ups and scale-ups  – particularly those that are venture capital backed –  
because they are cash-flow negative, with no track record to underpin, or collateral (required for the 
non-guaranteed part of the loan) to secure such finance. Their main assets are IP and talent, while 
any personal assets that they might have had will have been used up.  Moreover, the way in which 
such schemes have been designed means that many HGEs are not eligible. For example, the UK’s 
Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CBILS) which provides financial support to smaller 
businesses (SMEs) across the UK that are losing revenue and seeing their cashflow disrupted as a 
result of the COVID-19 outbreak requires businesses to meet the lending criteria of banks in order to 
qualify. However, many would not meet this requirement: they might not have sufficient trading 
record or they may currently be loss making – in the so-called ‘valley of death’ – hence unable to 
service a bank loan.  Indeed, the UK government admits that around 20 per cent of businesses are 
excluded from the emergency government loan schemes that have been implemented in recent 
weeks.54  A new loan guarantee scheme for companies not able to access CBILS has been 
advocated.55 Support to enable firms to furlough staff provide few benefits to new and small firms. 
They have few staff but need them to be able to continue to trade: if their staff are furloughed they 
are dead.56 
 
In short, loan schemes and furlough schemes are not suitable for the high-growth, loss-making 
companies that form the majority of the startup and scaleup ecosystem. Interventions to support the 
survival of HGEs and the emergence of high growth potential start-ups in the recovery phase need to 
be based around other forms of financial support, specifically increasing the availability of risk 
capital.  Without this, significant numbers of the innovative start-ups and scale-ups that will be 
needed to drive economic recovery will not get the funding that they require. Business angels need 
to be a major focus for such interventions. As noted earlier, they are at the start of the 
entrepreneurial pipeline, typically providing the first source of external finance to start-up and early 
phase companies. And as angel investing has increasingly become organized into managed groups so 
this has enhanced their financial capabilities, increasing both their size of investment and ability to 
make follow-on investments, thereby filling the so-called ‘second equity gap’ that has emerged over 
the past decade as venture capital funds have increased the size of their investments. Moreover, 
business angels and angel groups are increasingly participating in larger syndicated financing rounds 
along with other types of investors.57 The non-financial support that angels are able to provide to 
their investee companies on account of their own extensive entrepreneurial and business 
                                     
52 See Sifted (2020) Support measures for startups affected by coronavirus: the ultimate resource, 24 th April. 
https://sifted.eu/articles/coronavirus-support-startups/ for information on Government support in EU countries.  
53 BVCA (2020b) op. cit. 
54 Smith (2020) op. cit. 
55 BVCA proposes emergency bridge funding for early stage companies in the digital economy, 6 th April.  
https://www.bvca.co.uk/media-and-publications/news/bvca-press-releases/details/BVCA-proposes-emergency-bridge-
funding-for-early-stage-companies-in-the-digital-economy?utm_campaign=1882479_Friday%20Focus%2010 -04-
20&utm_medium=dotmailer&utm_source=BVCA 
56 Ibid. 
57 Mason, C (2018) Financing entrepreneurial ventures, in R Blackburn, D de Clercq and J Heinonen (eds) The Sage 
Handbook of Small Business and Entrepreneurship (Sage: London), pp 321 -349. 
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experience, in the form of advice, expertise, connections, mentoring and emotional support, is also 
critical. 
 
 
4.2.1 Co-investment Schemes 
 
The conventional way in which governments have sought to increase the supply of finance is through 
co-investment schemes. Although there are a number of co-investment models and structures they 
share some key features: they comprise government-funded investment funds that invests alongside 
business angels, committing one euro for every euro that the private investors invest. Some co-
investment schemes partner with venture capital funds. The co-investment fund invests under the 
same terms and conditions as the private investors on a pari-passu basis. The fund largely relies on 
the due diligence work carried out by the business angels to reduce costs. The risk of moral hazard is 
low because business angels have ‘skin in the game’. Although of relatively recent origin, there are 
now reported to be over 150 co-investment and related funds in 23 European countries. The purpose 
of the funds is to support angel investors by sharing risks and enabling them to achieve greater 
portfolio diversification and to improve investment capacities by leveraging additional capital.  It is 
significant that first co-investment scheme -  the Scottish Co-Investment Fund - emerged in the 
aftermath of the post-2000 crash to address the liquidity constraints faced by individual angel 
investors and by angel syndicates as a result of the withdrawal of existing VC investors from the 
Scottish market, and increased reports of good companies failing to raise equity capital.58   
 
By being based on 3rd party validation – in this case the willingness of a business angel to write a 
cheque to a start-up business - co-investment schemes address concerns that, on the one hand, 
because of adverse selection problems much of the funding that government makes available to 
support potential HGEs will ineffective,59 and on the other hand that governments cannot ‘pick 
winners’. Companies that have been accepted into recognized accelerators and incubators has been 
suggested as a further appropriate metric that identifies firms that have passed independent due 
diligence and would therefore be appropriate for government support.60 
 
Evaluations of co-investment schemes have generally been favourable, concluding that they are 
effective in leveraging investment capital from existing investors by enabling them to do more and 
larger deals, and doing so in a manner that minimizes the cost to the public purse and the risk to 
public funds.61  Moreover, the limited evidence available suggests that co-investment schemes 
generate a positive return to the public purse over the longer term. However, the effectiveness of co-
investment schemes is likely to be reduced at the present time because of constraints on the ability 
of business angels and other early stage investors invest. One option might therefore be to raise the 
ratio of public-private investment from its present 1:1 ratio.  But even so, one commentator argues 
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that “coinvestment schemes may save the very best prospects but a lot of startups will be left out.”62 
Hence, they need to be complemented by other initiatives.  
 
 
4.2.2 Tax incentives to business angels 
 
Many countries offer tax incentives to business angels to shift the risk-reward balance of making high 
risk investments in early stage businesses.  The UK’s Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS) and Seed 
Enterprise Investment Scheme (SEIS) is one of the most generous, giving 30% tax relief on 
investments in qualifying businesses as well as a range of other tax breaks.  Investors can qualify for 
these tax breaks either by investing directly in qualifying businesses or via professionally managed 
investment funds (EIS Funds and Venture Capital Trusts).  In 2019 £1.9bn was invested in over 4,000 
businesses. Evaluations indicate that the government gets £4 back in tax revenue for every £1 
invested and 9 jobs are created for every £1m invested. However, because most EIS investing occurs 
near the end of the tax year (5 April) the timing of the onset of the coronavirus crisis has resulted in a 
70% decline in fund-raising in 2019-20. It has been suggested that EIS relief is raised to 80% to 
overcome the declining risk appetite of wealthy private individuals and encourage the release of 
capital that is currently not being invested. Investors also need to be incentivized to invest 
throughout the tax year and, in particular, in the early part of the 2020-21 tax year. A further 
suggestion is that the annual limits on how much investors can invest and how much companies can 
raise should be raised.  For example, VCTs are restricted from investing more than £12m (£20m for 
knowledge-intensive startups) in a single company. If the limits were temporarily raised, the scheme 
could be repurposed to allow startups to raise bridging capital from investors they already work 
with.63  
 
 
4.2.3 Convertible Debt Instruments 
 
Tech startups that have raised a small seed round from angels and small micro funds also need to be 
the focus for targeted support. Typically, these innovation intensive startups would have hired a 
small team, built out an MVP and be progressing towards achieving the milestones and commercial 
metrics required to raise a late seed/ early Series A round from VC's and institutional investors. The 
drop in economic activity caused by COVID 19 will mean that these predominately B2B startups will 
find booked pilot sales will be postponed, the possibility of meeting new clients to achieve new sales 
highly curtailed and as a result their monthly "burn rates/losses" will increase and their already tight 
runway to achieve their product/ market fit milestones will shorten, and ultimately running out of 
cash. Their existing angels and micro funds are unlikely or unable to help with bridging money. 
Consequently, without help these startups that have achieved first signals that they have a product 
and business model that work and creates value for their initial early adopting customers and hence 
could achieve something big and significant are highly likely to die.  
 
A number of commentators have identified the need for governments to create a convertible debt 
instrument aimed primarily, but not exclusively, at seed stage start-ups to buy them time to survive 
COVID 19 and get back to the commercial trajectory they were demonstrating before the pandemic 
arrived. This is a short-term debt that converts to equity at the next funding round. Investors loan 
money to the business, with these convertible notes either subsequently redeemed (for a profit) at 
                                     
62 Dumitriu, S (2020) Most start-ups will fail: we should save them anyway. The Entrepreneurs Network, 7 April. 
https://www.tenentrepreneurs.org/blog/most-startups-will-fail-we-should-save-them-anyway 
63  Dimitriu (2020) op. cit.  
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the end of the pandemic by the recovered startup founders and shareholders or converted into 
"discounted" shares when the startups raises their next seed+ or Series A round. It is therefore not a 
handout: it is an investment that should generate returns once the economy recovers. Government 
would work with existing investors – angel groups and (micro) venture funds to identify, reach and 
assess the eligible startups and even allocate the capital via the convertible notes.  64  It is also 
important that the tax breaks available to business angels (such as the UK’s Enterprise Investment 
Scheme) should also apply to investments in the form of convertible debt as well as straight equity: 
typically they are not.  
 
A proposal for the creation of a £300m UK “Runway Fund” that would provide convertible loan notes 
with discounts to start-ups of up to £500,000 to give them at least nine more months of operations 
and would then convert into equity at the next round could invest initially in around 600 start-ups.65 
Implementing a similar scheme for companies further along the funding path would require much 
greater financial commitment by governments. The British Venture Capital Association have 
proposed that government finances a £500m bridge funding facility for early stage companies 
supplemented by £125m from the private sector to provide up to £5m per company in the form of a 
convertible loan in the digital, biotech and life science sectors. 66  However, critics argue that the 
commitment of venture capital firms to put in 25p for every £1 provided by the government does not 
go nearly far enough and that the split must be much more even.67 
 
 
4.2.4 Non-Dilutive Finance 
 
Venture capital initiatives need to be complemented by intervention to increase the supply of non-
dilutive finance (NDF), notably grants for innovation and commercialisation.  NDF programmes are 
important for three reason.  First, seed investors rarely invest in ideas alone. They recognise that the 
business plan is ‘a work of fiction’. NDF supports the discovery and early commercialisation stages, 
funding ideas to market which, by providing evidence and validation that creates credibility, 
enhances their investability.  Second, if entrepreneurs have to raise equity at too early a stage then 
they will experience significant dilution by the time their business gets to the scale-up stage, with 
potentially negative implications for their motivation and that of employees with share options, and 
limits their return on exit which, in turn, may reduce the scale of any entrepreneurial recycling that 
they are able to undertake.68 Third, by enabling firms to achieve certain milestones it increases 
valuation. The support that often comes with NDF schemes is also critical. Governments have been 
encouraged to pay innovation grants up-front rather than in arrears and adopt a light touch to 
auditing to make speedy payments. 
 
 
4.2.5 Reinventing Government Procurement 
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65 Ibid. 
66 BVCA (2020a) op. cit. 
67 Financial Times (2020) Lombard: start-up saviours, 6th April. https://www.ft.com/content/523024de-9115-45ee-923a-
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The most effective form of non-dilutive funding is revenue. Indeed, entrepreneurs are often given 
the advice that “the best money comes from customers”. Procurement is one of the biggest and 
possibly most underrated levers of government given that they are the largest purchaser of goods 
and services in an economy. But “government procurement” usually involves complex processes, red 
tape, long delays and high costs, and disadvantaging technology start-ups and growth from bidding 
for contracts because the process is too costly, lengthy and unpredictable. The COVID-19 pandemic is 
changing this approach because of the dramatic increases in global demand for crucial health-related 
products, requiring governments to streamline previously complex procedures which had enabled 
many entrepreneurs to pivot their business to produce urgently needed products. This highlights the 
potential for Governments to support technology start-up and scale up community by reinventing 
their procurement so that it is aligned with technology and accessible to smaller companies. The 
development of agile procurement across all of government that integrates cutting-edge innovations 
into the delivery of public services that empowers innovative businesses to help public servants to 
find fast and reliable solutions to some of their most challenging problems would provide economic 
stimulus by enabling technology start-ups and scale-ups to sell into government. This would require a 
procurement process with the following features: (a) it would define problems, not solutions to 
empower the problem-solving capacity of the technology sector; (b) it would create a joint 
government-industry marketplace to establish a standardized process where government can more 
easily engage with qualified vendors who specialize in solving the sorts of problems they face; and (c) 
leverage the innovation infrastructure by procuring commercialized innovations through open 
competitions focused on solving defined problems.69 Without such changes healthtech companies 
will not have a route to market.70 
 
 
4.2.6 Design and Delivery Issues 
 
Policy ineffectiveness is frequently linked to its design and delivery.71  The pressure on governments 
to react quickly to the crisis has meant that they have had to work with existing institutions rather 
than designing new delivery mechanisms. Nevertheless, the design and delivery of these 
interventions will determine their effectiveness. Several have attracted criticism. For example, as 
noted above, most startups and scaleups do not qualify under the UK’s Coronavirus Business 
Interruption Loans Scheme (CBILS) because only businesses that were profitable before the crisis are 
eligible. It was initially also limited to companies with a turnover of less than £45m but this 
restriction has now been lifted. The VC industry also raised concerns that VC-backed companies may 
excluded because investors who serve on their board may also be directors of other companies and 
hence seen as affiliated to a larger entity which is too large to be eligible. 72 73 This has now also been 
removed. And the banks – which are the conduit for delivering the loans - have been criticized both 
for their slowness in approving applications and, initially for requiring directors give personal 
guarantees on that part of the loan that is not covered by the guarantee, leaving directors with the 
possibility they will be personally liable if their business fails. A requirement for banks to first offer 
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borrowers standard loan products before they could access the scheme has subsequently been 
dropped.74 Another example of the exclusionary effects of scheme design is the UK’s job retention 
scheme which enables firms to apply for a grant that covers 80% of their usual monthly wage costs, 
up to £2,500 a month to furlough employees. However, some company directors have a low salary-
high dividend remuneration package. But dividends are not counted as income even though they are 
taxed as earnings (albeit at different rates to salary). This discriminates against those who pay their 
remuneration in this way either for legitimate tax planning reasons or to avoid the need to set up an 
expensive payroll system. Finally, the new UK Future Fund – which will invest between £125,000 and 
£5m in qualifying companies in the form of a convertible loan, matching the amount invested by 
private investors – has been criticized because of the requirement that companies must already have 
raised £250,000 from investors within the past five years, hence excluding start-ups. Moreover, it is 
not compatible with the SEIS/EIS which fuels the UK startup ecosystem, thereby “making it useless 
for the very audience that can most benefit from it”.75 The deal terms have also been criticized, 
described by one commentator as “deal terms that an aggressive investor would squeeze out of a 
distressed company that had nowhere else to go”.76 
 
 
4.2.7 Scrutiny of Proposed Acquisitions of Emerging Scale-Ups 
 
The crisis is likely to result in an increase in ‘necessity exits’. First, capital-squeezed companies that 
are unable to raise finance from their existing investors may turn to acquisition as a survival strategy. 
Second, investors who are financially constrained and may therefore be unable to fund their 
portfolio companies for longer may make the decision to seek to sell some of their investee 
businesses to generate cash to support other businesses in their portfolio. This increases the risk that 
innovative companies with a shortage of liquidity will be bought by opportunistic well-capitalised 
corporates, potentially removing the knowledge assets outside of the EU or closing them down 
because they might in the future challenge their competitive position before they have developed 
momentum (‘buy and kill’).77  The risk that promising European HGEs will be targets of ‘predatory 
behaviour’ by companies and investors (such as hedge funds) particularly but not exclusively based in 
other regions of the world, should therefore prompt governments to consider tightening their rules 
on foreign takeovers. Concern has been raised that “a few powerful firms are set to gain more clout” 
as a result of the crisis, noting that, for example, it costs less to insure Johnson & Johnson's debt 
against default than Canada's and Apple's gross cash pile of $207bn exceeds most countries' fiscal 
stimulus.78 Australia has temporarily tightened its rules on foreign takeovers on concerns that 
strategic assets could be sold off cheaply as a result of the coronavirus crisis.79 Ursula von der Leyen, 
president of the European Commission, has conveyed a similar message in a speech addressed to EU 
member states, saying that  “You should use all options to protect critical European companies from 
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foreign takeovers or influence that could undermine our security and public order.”80 Margrethe 
Vestager, Executive Vice President of the European Commission and European Commissioner for 
Competition has also proposed that European countries should buy stakes in companies to stave off 
the threat of Chinese takeovers to protect businesses fighting for survival during the Covid-19 
pandemic.81 Regulators are already working on proposals to grant EU countries sweeping powers to 
derail unfair competition from state-backed enterprises. Whereas these particular actions are aimed 
at protecting large firms in key sectors there is a strong argument for also applying them to emerging 
tech companies with valuable intellectual property whose acquisitions might come ‘under the radar’.  
 
 
4.2.8 Protecting the entrepreneurial ecosystem 
 
The HGEs that will survive this crisis are the ones adaptable, being able to quickly adjust their 
expenses (e.g. travel, accommodation, cloud computing costs) to bring them more closely into line 
with their declining revenue, to offer share options to employees in lieu of salary, to see downturn 
opportunities, to successfully pivot their business model, develop customer-centric strategies to 
minimise customer loss, to continually apply financial stress testing  and apply risk management 
techniques. There is little that governments can do directly to help firms take these actions. 
Entrepreneurs access resources, information and knowledge to develop their capabilities through 
social interactions with resource providers (institutions, organisations and individuals) in their 
ecosystem. It is these relationships that facilitate entrepreneurship. Moreover, the resources in an 
ecosystem are sustained and reproduced through relationships amongst the various actors and 
stakeholders. However, government can provide backing for existing business support networks to 
provide financial advice and mentoring. Business angel groups can play a critical role here, both to 
draw upon the expertise of their investors to provide vital support to their investee businesses with 
advice, mentoring, coaching, online learning and psychological and emotional assistance and to 
provide channels to share information and resources between angels to enable them to provide 
more effective support. More generally, Governments need to ensure that entrepreneurial 
ecosystems remain intact. There is, for example, concern that co-working spaces, incubators and 
accelerators will suffer loss of income as tenants become unable to pay, threatening their survival82 
and “forcing entrepreneurs to go back to their garages”.83 
 
 
4.2.9 Need for Place-Based Policies  
 
Government interventions must ensure that the contraction of VC investing does not widen existing 
geographical disparities in venture capital investing and, as a consequence, high growth firms. VC 
investments are highly geographical, evidenced in terms of the amounts invested, the number of 
investments and the size of investments, favouring the most economically developed cities and 
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regions.84 A  JRC research study shows that firms in European start-up hotspots raise more money 
and more funding rounds.85 Moreover, a much higher proportion of the VC investment that occurs 
outside of these venture capital hotspots is underpinned by government VC funds86. The JRC study 
further shows that the regional distribution of start-up VC is more evenly spread than that of both 
later-stage and stage seed87 (which may be linked to the concentration of accelerators in major 
urban hubs). Business angel investing is also geographically concentrated, although not to the same 
extent as institutional VC.   
 
A significant explanation for the uneven geography of VC is that the locations of VC firms is also 
clustered in major financial centres. VC investing is a person-to-person activity underpinned by the 
need for trust between both investor and entrepreneur.  These can be difficult to establish virtually. 
Informal networks are a major source of deal referrals. The VC’s investment decision is based on due 
diligence that draws significantly on face-to-face meetings with entrepreneurs. Their post-investment 
monitoring and value-added support also involves personal interaction.  However, the importance of 
spatial proximity is stage dependent.  This reflects differences in the nature and intensity of VC 
activity at different stages in the investment life cycle. Seed stage investors are most likely to invest 
locally: this is because information asymmetries are greatest at the seed stage and are most 
effectively managed by interpersonal contacts.  Investors also work most intensively with their seed 
stage investee businesses. Interpersonal contacts are less important in later stage investments 
because information asymmetries are lower and the nature of the support provided is strategic.  
Moreover, VC investors who make long distance investments frequently syndicate with partners who 
are more closely located to the investee company and are therefore able to leverage the spatial 
proximity of these original seed investor(s) where face-to-face contact is required.  Hence, the 
distance between companies and their investors extends as the company progresses through its life 
cycle, with companies typically relying on local investors for seed and early stage funding and for 
later stage funding from investors who are less likely to be local, particularly for firms outside of 
major economic centres where the larger VC firms are concentrated.  Putting this another way, the 
proportion of seed deals led or solely funded by local investors in the same ecosystem is higher than 
the proportion of later stage deals (Pitchbook, 2019). In the USA the median distance between 
investor and investee business is under 100 miles for seed investment but 400 miles for later stage 
investments.88  
 
The concern is that the retraction of VC investing will have a disproportionate impact on regions 
outside of major economic centres that are traditional venture hubs with detrimental effects on 
entrepreneurship and innovation.  This has two dimensions. First, a contraction in seed investment in 
local markets will have a negative impact on start-up rates.  Start-ups need local sources of seed 
capital – which typically comes from business angels, angel groups and seed funds - to be able to 
develop a meaningful track-record and metrics: without this they will not be able to get the attention 
of larger non-local venture capital firms. Second, it might become harder for businesses in less 
developed ecosystems that have raised local seed investment to attract later stage investment. This 
would arise, first, if a flight to safety pushes investors to invest closer to home, second, if non-local 
investors are less willing to travel in the future, and third if they have less capital to commit to new 
investments. In all of these circumstances investors would be likely to focus on deploying their 
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limited capital to make investments in businesses located in closer geographical proximity to their 
office(s). This would be detrimental to the ability of start-ups in less developed ecosystems to scale. 
However, as the economic implications of such a development would only become apparent over the 
medium-term monitoring of VC investing in the immediate future is essential.  
 
This has important policy implications.  First, limiting interventions to the national scale is likely to 
have geographically uneven impacts, favouring existing venture capital hotspots.  Accordingly there is 
a need for national-level interventions to be accompanied by measures to support venture capital in 
regions with less developed financial ecosystems.  Second, most government interventions – 
particularly in less economically advantaged regions - are focused on increasing the supply of seed 
stage VC as this is where market inefficiencies are thought to be most pronounced.  These 
interventions typically have stage and size of investment eligibility criteria.  This focus and the 
investment restrictions will not be appropriate if it becomes harder for less developed ecosystems to 
‘import’ follow-on investments from venture capital hubs, indicating the need for intervention at 
later stages in the venture life cycle. 
 
 
  
 30 
APPENDIX: RESEARCH PROPOSAL 
 
Business angels play a critical role in the entrepreneurial ecosystem.  It has been estimated that they 
fund 20 to 50 times the number of start-ups that venture capital funds do, and are increasingly 
funding their investee companies over more than one round and increasingly to exit.  They also 
provide much of the deal flow for venture capital funds. Moreover, UK evidence shows that business 
angel investment activity held up better than venture capital funding in the aftermath of the 2008 
financial crisis.89   So as well as undertaking close to real time monitoring of trends and developments 
within VC markets - globally, in the EU and in individual countries - in order to detect and relate 
important swings etc. it is important that JRC also closely monitors the angel market. It is only 
feasible to do this for the visible angel market – i.e. angel groups and high profile individual angels. I 
therefore recommend that JRC works with national business angel organisations (in conjunction with 
EBAN) to survey their members in order to take the pulse of angel investing on a regular basis to 
identify the demand for finance that they are receiving, their current and expected future investment 
activity, support measures required, and identification of good practice that should be shared.  
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